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in	 the	 formation	of	wages	 is	 important	 in	 the	context	of	high	unemployment	 rates	 in	
South Africa. In this study we find that while institutionalised collective bargaining system 
covered	substantially	more	 formal	sector	workers	 in	2005	(30	percent)	compared	 to	
1995	(15	percent),	this	still	meant	that	less	than	a	third	of	the	formally	employed	were	
covered	by	bargaining	councils.	Notwithstanding	 this,	 the	overall	 rise	 in	 the	number	
of	workers	covered	by	bargaining	council	agreements	between	1995	and	2005	was	
driven	almost	primarily	by	 the	 introduction	of	public	sector	councils.	Thus,	bargaining	
council coverage in the first decade of democracy is characterised by an erosion of 
coverage	within	 the	private	sector	bargaining	council	system	on	 the	one	hand	and	
the	rapid	 rise	of	 this	system	of	bargaining	 in	 the	public	sector.	The	descriptive	data	
and multivariate models show therefore a significant wage premium associated with 
coverage under public sector councils in 2005, in excess of the large and significant 
union	wage	premium.	The	decline	in	the	bargaining	council	system	in	the	private	sector	
is	accompanied	by	declining	wage	premia	 for	 formal	sector	workers	covered	under	
private sector bargaining council agreements, with our preferred specification in 2005 
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 1. Introduction 
Bargaining	councils	(known	as	industrial	councils	before	1995)	are	the	key	institutions	
involved	 in	 the	statutory	system	of	collective	bargaining	and	wage	determination	 in	
the	South	African	 labour	market.	A	bargaining	council	can	be	established	by	one	or	
more	registered	trade	unions	and	one	or	more	registered	employer	organisations	for	
a specific sector and area. Worker interests are therefore represented at a bargaining 
council	by	 the	party	 trade	unions.	Both	 trade	unions	and	bargaining	councils	have	










membership	 in	 the	South	African	 labour	market.	Depending	on	 the	data	sets	used,	
dependent	variable	(hourly,	weekly,	monthly	or	annual	wages)	and	 the	methodology	
used,	the	size	of	the	estimated	union	premium	differs	widely.1	These	studies	generally	
found a positive and significant wage premium associated with union membership. 
Not	many	studies	have,	however,	investigated	the	role	of	bargaining	councils	in	setting	
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Section	2	provides	a	brief	 overview	of	 the	development	of	 institutionalised	wage	
formation	in	the	South	African	labour	market,	focusing	on	the	establishment	of	industrial	
councils,	 the	development	of	a	dual	system	of	 industrial	 relations	 in	 the	country	and	






account	 for	 the	simultaneous	 impact	of	a	range	of	 relevant	variables	on	earnings,	 in	
particular,	isolating	the	impact	of	industrial/bargaining	council	and	union	membership	on	
earnings.	Section	6	concludes.
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As such, then, industrial councils represented the first institutionalised representation 




collective bargaining and industrial conflict. According to Godfrey (1992: 1) the central 












1992:	7).	The	geographical	and	 industrial	scope	 (which	constituted	 the	 jurisdiction	
of	 the	council)	was	also	 left	 for	 the	parties	 to	be	determined.	Finally,	 the	 issues	that	
these	councils	chose	to	negotiate	on,	were	 left	 to	 the	discretion	of	 the	parties	 to	 the	
council, but generally included wages, social welfare benefit funds, and conditions of 
employment	such	as	working	hours.	
The	 Industrial	Conciliation	Act	did	 require	 that	 the	parties	be	 representative	of	 the	
jurisdiction	for	which	the	council	was	seeking	registration.	The	issue	of	representation	




in	 the	Government	Gazette	 and	 to	 extend	 the	 agreements	 to	 all	 employers	 and	
employees	within	 the	 jurisdiction	of	 the	council.	The	Minister	could	use	his	discretion	
both	in	the	publication	of	agreements	and	the	extension	of	agreements	and	had	to	be	
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satisfied that the parties to the Industrial Council were sufficiently representative of the 
employers	and	employees	within	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Council.	For	an	agreement	to	be	





One	of	 the	most	 important	 features	of	 the	Act,	however,	was	 that	 it	excluded	pass-
bearing	Africans	 from	 the	definition	of	an	 ‘employee’,	meaning	 that	 these	workers	
were	excluded	from	representation	on	 industrial	councils	and	also	excluded	from	the	
agreements	reached	by	industrial	councils.	This	essentially	resulted	in	the	development	
of a dual system of industrial relations defined by race (Godfrey, 1992: 14). 
The	voluntary	nature	of	 the	 industrial	council	system	meant	 that	 industrial	councils	
developed	 in	diverse	and	uneven	ways.	The	envisaged	system	of	national	 industrial	
councils	did	not	materialise	due	to	a	variety	of	factors	such	as	the	exclusion	of	African	






1991:	 7).	These	 trade	unions	used	 the	 councils	 for	 the	exclusive	benefit	 of	 their	
members	and	to	the	detriment	of	unorganised	or	poorly	organised	sectors	of	the	labour	
market.	
The	Wage	Act	was	 introduced	 in	1925	as	a	companion	 to	 the	 Industrial	Conciliation	
Act.	The	Act	established	a	Wage	Board	to	make	recommendations	on	minimum	wages	
and	working	conditions.	The	Board	was	appointed	by	the	Minister	of	Manpower	for	a	
specific period and undertook investigations and made recommendations to the Minister 
before a wage determination was made for a specific area, sector of categories of 
employees.		The	Minister	was	under	no	obligation	to	make	a	wage	determination	based	
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with	a	proposal	on	wages	and	other	conditions	of	employment	 for	 the	workers	 they	
employed,	 and	 they	 could	 request	 that	 such	 proposals	 be	made	 binding	 on	 all	
employers	and	employees	 in	the	 industry,	area	or	 trade	concerned.	After	consultation	
with	 the	Wage	Board	and	consideration	of	 representation,	 the	Minister	could	 issue	a	
labour	order	 to	 implement	 the	proposals.	The	order	was	published	 in	a	Government	
Gazette	 in	 a	manner	 similar	 to	 which	wage	 determinations	were	 published	 and	
remained	applicable	until	superceded	by	any	other	wage	regulating	measure	that	was	
determined	to	be	binding	(Standing	et	al,	1996:	144).
In	 the	absence	of	an	 industrial	council	agreement,	a	wage	determination	or	a	 labour	
order,	the	provisions	of	the	Basic	Conditions	of	Employment	Act	(BCEA)	of	1983	applied	
(Standing	et	al,	1996:	133).	Wages	could	be	determined	through	enterprise	or	company	
level bargaining. In non-unionised sectors and firms, however, employment conditions, 
including	wages,	were	often	determined	unilaterally	by	management	and	 took	 the	
form	of	individual	contracts.	In	higher-level	occupations	and	for	higher	skilled	workers,	
employment	conditions	also	 took	 the	 form	of	 individual	contracts	 (RSA,	1996:	54).	
Industrial	Council	agreements	superceded	both	 the	BCEA	and	Wage	Act	 in	 terms	of	
matters	covered	by	the	agreement	(Standing	et	al,	1996:		147).			
Functions	and	Powers	of	the	Industrial	Councils




on	matters	 related	 to	wages,	working	conditions	and	benefit	 funds.	A	council	also	
established	procedures	for	dealing	with	disputes	arising	within	its	jurisdiction.
An	equal	number	of	persons	from	the	employer	and	trade	union	organisations	had	to	
be	appointed	 to	 represent	 the	 two	parties	 in	 the	council,	and	 these	representatives	
constituted	 the	bargaining	 forum	that	conducted	 the	actual	negotiations.	The	 forum	
met	periodically	according	to	 its	constitutional	requirements	 to	attend	to	 its	business,	
as	well	as	annually	or	biannually	 to	negotiate	on	 its	main	agreement	(Godfrey,	1992:	
8).	 The	main	 agreement	 of	 an	 industrial	 council	 referred	 to	 the	 agreement	 that	
prescribed	minimum	wage	rates	and	conditions	of	work.	Once	the	main	agreement	was	
published,	 the	 full	agreement	was	generally	never	 renegotiated.	Trade	unions	could	




who	published	a	notice	 renewing	and	amending	 the	main	agreement	 (including	 the	
period	of	 the	renewal).	An	entirely	new	agreement	was	usually	only	published	after	a	
number	or	years	(Godfrey,	1992:	9).
The councils appointed full-time officials to staff the council in order to attend to its day-
to-day	operations.	These	usually	included	a	secretary,	a	number	of	designated	agents,	
and administrative personnel. The majority of the councils were financed by a levy 
(usually	prescribed	in	the	main	agreement)	 imposed	on	all	employers	and	employees	
within	the	council’s	jurisdiction	(Godfrey,	1992:	8).	
Some councils established benefit funds (for example, pension funds and sick pay 
funds) in the main agreement or in separate agreements. Benefit fund agreements 
were	generally	not	renegotiated	very	often	and	remained	in	place	much	longer	than	the	
main	agreement.	Councils	usually	established	sub-committees	to	oversee	the	operation	
of the benefit fund (Godfrey, 1992: 10).
A	sub-committee	within	the	council	was	usually	set	up	to	deal	with	disputes	within	 its	








(Godfrey & Macun, 1991: 7). The fact that pass-bearing Africans were not defined as 
employees	and,	therefore,	not	included	in	the	system	of	industrial	councils,	only	served	
to	reinforce	the	weak	bargaining	power	of	African	employees.	Internalised	management	
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It	also	had	some	 less	satisfactory	consequences	and	 these	were	highlighted	by	 the	





for	 less-skilled	workers	and,	 therefore,	 these	workers	were	not	covered	by	 industrial	
council agreements. Another identified failure of the industrial council system was the 
limited	number	of	national	 industry-wide	councils	that	were	created,	which	was	mostly	
the	result	of	the	domination	by	craft	councils	(Godfrey,	1992:	18,	19).	
As a result of the findings of the commission, the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 
was	repealed	and	replaced	by	the	Industrial	Conciliation	Act	No	36	of	1937.	This	new	
act	sought	 to	 improve	the	protection	of	 the	 interests	of	workers	not	party	 to	 industrial	











In	1948,	 the	National	Party	came	 into	power	 in	South	Africa	and	appointed	another	
Industrial	Legislation	Commission	with	 the	 intention	 to	 revise	 industrial	 regulation	
and	bring	 it	 in	 line	with	the	apartheid	policy	(Godfrey,	1992:	20,	21).	The	commission	
found	that	the	wage	gap	between	the	skilled	and	unskilled	workers	persisted	after	the	
introduction of the new Industrial Conciliation Act in 1937 and continued to reflect racial 
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discrimination	(Godfrey,	1992:	21).	 In	addition,	 the	commission	found	that	 inspectors	
representing	African	workers’	 interests	at	 industrial	councils	were	 ineffective	as	 they	





did	make	changes	to	 labour	 legislation	 that	would	 impact	on	the	development	of	 the	
industrial	council	system.	First,	the	Native	Labour	(Settlement	of	Disputes)	Act	of	1953	
excluded	Africans	from	registered	unions	and	prohibited	them	from	taking	part	in	strike	










If	 the	numbers	by	 race	group	were	 too	small	 to	create	separate	unions,	separate	
branches	by	race	could	be	created	in	the	same	union.	However,	only	White	members	








committees	was	rejected	by	 the	majority	of	African	workers	 in	 favour	of	 independent	
trade	unions.	
In	 the	seventies,	 the	power	of	African	workers	grew	considerably	and	by	1979	there	
were	34	unregistered	African	unions.	As	 these	unions	were	not	 recognised	 legally,	
their	activities	increasingly	emphasised	the	shortcomings	of	the	existing	dual	system	of	
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labour	regulations	as	in	some	instances	the	industrial	regulations	were	being	bypassed	
as	employers	recognised	and	bargained	with	African	unions	(SALDRU,	1990:	5).
In	1977,	 the	Wiehahn	Commission	of	 Inquiry	 into	Labour	Legislation	was	appointed.	
They	recommended	 that	African	workers	be	allowed	 to	 join	 registered	 trade	unions,	
while	unions	should	be	allowed	to	admit	members	from	any	race	group.	This	 implied	
that	African	workers	would	be	allowed	direct	 representation	on	 industrial	councils.	 In	
1979	the	government	adopted	the	recommendation	of	 the	Wiehahn	Commission	and	
amended the Industrial Conciliation Act to change the definition of an “employee” to 
include	African	workers	with	permanent	urban	 residency.	Following	much	criticism,	
the	Act	was	amended	a	second	 time	 in	1979	 to	 include	African	contract	workers	
and commuters in the definition. Participation in an industrial council was, however, 
conditional	on	 trade	union	registration	 in	 terms	of	 the	Act.	African	trade	unions	were	
reluctant	 to	 register	 and	 increasingly	 pursued	 plant-level	 bargaining	 outside	 the	
industrial	council	system	(Godfrey,	1992:	27).
In	1981	the	Industrial	Conciliation	Act	was	once	again	amended	and	the	administrative	













support	 for	participation	 in	central	bargaining.	 In	1982	at	 the	Second	Congress	of	
African	unions,	some	of	the	larger	unions	called	for	greater	participation	in	centralised	
bargaining,	 claiming	 that	 it	 would	 be	more	 effective	 than	 plant-level	 bargaining.	
The	Federation	of	South	African	Trade	Unions	 (FOSATU),	 the	 largest	 federation	of	
independent	 trade	unions	at	 the	 time,	agreed	 to	participate	 in	 the	 industrial	council	
2	 		 Now	referred	to	as	the	Labour	Relations	Act	(LRA)	of	956.
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a series of mergers as affiliates sought to comply with COSATU’s policy of one union in 
one	industry.	However,	the	established	industrial	councils	were	not	adequately	prepared	
to deal with the interests of these unions, which conflicted sharply with their own. The 




increases	 far	 in	excess	of	 the	minimum	 levels	set	at	 industrial	councils.	While	 the	
unions	participated	 in	 the	 industrial	council	system,	many	continued	to	pursue	plant-
level	bargaining.	The	essence	of	 the	 industrial	council	system	was	to	bargain	at	one	
level	only	and	many	of	the	employer	parties	to	the	councils	were	opposed	to	continuing	






 2.1 Bargaining Councils in the Labour Relations Environment since 1994
The	 incoherent	and	 inconsistent,	and	 in	many	cases,	still	 racist,	system	of	 industrial	
relations	which	characterised	 the	pre-1994	era	was	clearly	 in	need	of	 significant	
overhaul	 with	 the	 advent	 of	 democratic	 rule.	 Within	 the	 labour	 market	 policy	
environment,	 the	 immediate	period	 following	the	election	of	 the	majority	government	

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was	characterised	by	a	 frantic	process	of	 recasting	 the	country’s	 labour	 regulatory	
environment.	The	outcome	of	 these	negotiations	between	employers	and	employees	





The	LRA	and	 the	BCEA	are	 the	 two	key	pieces	of	 regulation	governing	bargaining	
councils	and	wage	determination	and	are	therefore	discussed	in	more	detail	here.
Bargaining	Councils	and	the	Legislative	Environment
The purpose of the LRA is to “advance economic development, social justice, labour 
peace and the democratisation of the workplace by fulfilling the primary objectives of 
the Act” (RSA, 1995: 8). The LRA regulates the organisational rights for trade unions, 
entrenches	 the	 right	 to	strike,	 regulates	collective	bargaining,	as	well	as	 regulates	
dispute	resolution	and	dismissal	procedures	(Bhorat	et	al.	2002:	43)
The	 LRA	 provides	 the	 legislative	 framework	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 bargaining	
councils.	 In	 terms	of	 the	 legislation,	one	or	more	registered	trade	unions	and	one	or	
more	 registered	employers’	organisations	may	establish	a	bargaining	council	 for	a	
sector	and	area.	The	Act	also	provides	 for	 the	State	 to	be	a	party	 to	any	bargaining	
council	 if	 it	 is	an	employer	 in	 the	sector	and	area	 in	which	 the	bargaining	council	 is	
established	(RSA,	1995:	22).	
Section	29	of	 the	LRA	regulates	 the	process	and	 requirements	 for	 the	 registration	
of	a	bargaining	council	 (RSA,	1995:	22-24).	 In	 terms	of	 this	section,	parties	wishing	
to	establish	a	bargaining	council	have	to	apply	 to	 the	registrar	of	 labour	relations	for	
registration	of	 the	bargaining	council.	After	 receiving	 the	application	 the	 registrar	 is	
required	to	publish	a	notice	in	the	Government	Gazette,	allowing	the	general	public	the	
opportunity	 to	object	 to	the	application.	The	LRA	sets	out	 the	steps	to	be	followed	by	
the	person	who	objects	as	well	as	the	applicant.	The	registrar	is	also	required	to	send	
a	copy	of	 the	notice	to	the	National	Economic	and	Development	Council	 (NEDLAC).3	











adequate	provision	 for	 the	 representation	of	small	and	medium	enterprises	on	 the	
council; and if the parties to the council are sufficiently representative of the sector and 
area as determined by NEDLAC or the Minister of Labour. If the registrar is satisfied 
that	 the	applicant	meets	all	 the	requirements	for	registration,	the	bargaining	council	 is	
registered	by	entering	the	council’s	name	in	the	register	of	councils.	If	the	requirements	
are	not	met,	the	applicant	is	allowed	30	days	to	comply	with	the	requirements.	









Section	32	 (RSA,	1995:	26,	27)	 regulates	 the	extension	of	collective	agreements	
concluded	in	a	bargaining	council.	In	terms	of	the	LRA,	a	bargaining	council	can	request	
the	Minister	of	Labour	in	writing	to	extend	a	collective	agreement	to	non-parties	which	




vote in favour of the extension. If the Minister is satisfied that all requirements have 
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Part D of the LRA (RSA, 1995: 29-30) specifically provides for the establishment of 





bargaining	 councils.	 Section	 38	 provides	 for	 the	 resolution	 of	 disputes	 between	
bargaining	councils	in	the	public	sector.
The	second	important	piece	of	 legislation	 in	terms	of	bargaining	councils	 is	 the	Basic	







Section 49 of Chapter 7 specifically allows for a collective agreement that has been 
negotiated	 in	a	bargaining	council	 to	alter,	 replace	or	exclude	any	basic	condition	of	
employment	if	the	collective	agreement	is	consistent	with	the	purpose	of	the	BCEA	and	
does	not	 infringe	on	employees’	entitlement	and	rights	as	set	out	 in	 the	BCEA	(RSA,	
1997: 21). It is in this sense, therefore, that the BCEA sets the minimum floor of rights 
for	all	employed	individuals	in	the	South	African	labour	market.	
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All the existing industrial councils established under the “old” LRA were deemed to be 
bargaining	councils	under	the	new	LRA	(Bhorat	et	al,	2002:	48).	Currently,	bargaining	
councils	 range	 from	very	 large	national	councils	 to	small	 regional	or	 local	councils	
(see	Godfrey	et	al,	2006:	6).	Bargaining	councils	potentially	cover	employees	 in	 the	

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private sector who are classified as semi-skilled or unskilled and working for employees. 
This means that when we look at the classifications in the Labour Force Survey, the 














In	1997,	 the	constitution	of	 the	PSCBC	was	registered.	 In	 line	with	provisions	 in	 the	
LRS,	 the	PSCBC	designated	 four	sectors	 for	 the	establishment	of	sectoral	public	
service	bargaining	councils	 (PSCBC,	2005).	The	councils	and	 their	scope	are	 the	
following	(note	that	in	all	cases	the	employer	is	the	State):
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As the name suggests, the PSCBC fulfils a co-ordinating function. It is also responsible 
for	overall	policy	 formation	on	dispute	resolution.	 Importantly,	wages	are	negotiated	
in	 the	PSCBC.	A	collective	agreement	signed	 in	 the	PSCBC	is	automatically	binding	
on	sectoral	councils,	unless	a	sectoral	council	has	an	agreement	 in	place	on	 the	




PSBC	remains	central	 to	 the	understanding	of	 the	determinants	of	wages	and	wage	
formation	in	the	post-apartheid South Africa labour market.
One	addition	to	the	above	public	sector	bargaining	councils	is	that	of	local	government	
employees.	The	 local	 government	 sector	 falls	under	 the	 jurisdiction	of	 the	South	
African	Local	Government	Bargaining	Council	 (SALGBC).	The	Interim	SALGBC	was	
established	in	1997,	followed	by	the	registration	of	the	SALGBC	in	2001	(see	SALGBC	
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a specific sector and area. A sectoral determination has to be made in accordance with 
the	provisions	in	Chapter	8	of	the	BCEA	and	by	publishing	a	notice	in	the	Government	
Gazette	(RSA,	1997:	23).	A	sectoral	determination	arises	 in	essence	out	of	a	process	
of	 research	and	consultation	between	the	relevant	employers	and	employees	 in	 the	
sector, Department of Labour (DoL) officials and the advisory board, the ECC, reporting 
to	the	Minister	of	Labour.	
A	sectoral	determination,	as	noted	above,	may	set	minimum	terms	and	conditions	
of	employment,	 including	minimum	wages.	 It	may	also	provide	 for	 the	adjustment	
of	minimum	wages,	 regulate	 the	manner,	 timing	and	other	conditions	of	payment	of	
remuneration	as	well	as	prohibit	or	 regulate	payment	of	 remuneration	 in	kind	(RSA,	
1997:	25).	The	Minister	of	Labour	may	not	publish	a	sectoral	determination	covering	
employees	 and	 employers	 who	 are	 already	 covered	 by	 a	 collective	 agreement	
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Currently,	 centralised	non-statutory	bargaining	 takes	place	 in	mining,	automobile	
manufacturing	 and	 the	 pelagic	 fishing	 sector.4	 	 In	 the	mining	 sector,	 centralised	





in	 the	coal	mining	 industry	 is	much	 lower,	estimated	at	about	36	percent	 in	2002.	
Most	of	 the	members	of	 the	Chamber	of	Mines	 in	 these	 two	 industries	are	covered	
by	 the	collective	agreements.	Gold	and	coal	mines	which	are	not	members	of	 the	
Chamber are covered by firm-level or mine-level collective bargaining agreements (See 
Godfrey,	2007	for	more	detail).	For	example,	while	the	majority	of	platinum	producers	
are members of the Chamber, the industry is mostly covered by company specific 
agreements.	The	main	employers	 in	 the	diamond	mining	 industry	are	also	Chamber	
	 This	section	on	non-statutory	centralised	bargaining	draws	on	Godfrey,	2007
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members,	but	again	 they	are	party	 to	company-specific	agreements	 (Chamber	of	
Mines,	2007).











also	 takes	place	at	a	decentralised	or	single-employer	 level,	with	examples	 found	 in	
retail	and	food	manufacturing.	For	example,	 in	 the	case	of	 the	Wholesale	and	Retail	
Trade	sector,	collective	bargaining	only	covers	a	small	 fraction	of	 the	sector,	with	 the	
remainder	covered	by	 the	sectoral	determination.	The	South	African	Commercial,	
Catering	and	Allied	Workers	Union	 (SACCAWU)	 is	 the	major	 union	 in	 the	 sector	
and bargains with national groups, medium-sized firms as well as small firms. The 
national firms include the major food, retail and furniture chains. Most of the firms 
bargain	at	a	national	 level	 for	 the	entire	chain.	 If	 they	have	 independent	operations	
or	 franchise	stores	as	part	of	 the	group,	 the	bargaining	unit	does	not	cover	 these.	
There	are	exceptions,	however,	where	the	bargaining	has	been	decentralised	to	each	
individual	store.	 In	 the	 food	manufacturing	sector,	bargaining	takes	place	at	different	
levels depending on the core business of the firms. Certain companies negotiate at a 
central	level	for	different	sub-sectors,	while	others	negotiate	at	plant-level.
Ultimately,	 though,	 it	 should	 be	 clear	 that	 wage	 formation	 in	 South	 Africa	 is	









Labour has to be satisfied that the trade unions whose members constitute the majority 
of	 the	members	of	 the	party	 trade	unions	and	 the	party	employer	organisations	 that	
employ	the	majority	of	workers	voted	in	favour	of	the	extension.	A	collective	agreement	
is	extended	by	publishing	it	in	the	Government	Gazette.
One	 of	 the	main	 criticisms	 levelled	 against	 the	 extension	 of	 bargaining	 council	





councils (Godfrey et al, 2006: 1). The extension to non-parties was the subject of fierce 
debate	 in	 the	mid-1990s	 in	terms	of	 the	unintended	consequence	 it	ostensibly	had	 in	












to	describe	 the	procedures	 to	be	 followed	 for	a	company	 to	obtain	exemption	 from	
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parties	and	employers	who	are	not	parties	(and	therefore	covered	by	the	extension	of	
an	agreement)	can	apply	for	exemptions	(Godfrey	et	al,	2006:	65).











1995	and	bargaining	councils	 in	2005	on	wage	formation	 in	 the	South	African	 labour	
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 4. Data and Descriptive Overview
 4.1 Data Sources and the Construction of Industrial and Bargaining   
 Council Coverage
In	order	 to	be	able	evaluate	 the	wage	premium	(if	any)	associated	with	membership	






annually	between	1994	and	1999.	The	LFS	 is	a	biannual	survey	 introduced	 in	2000	





Industrial	 council	 coverage	 for	 1995	was	 estimated	 using	 the	 Industrial	 Council	
Digest	(Godfrey,	1992)	and	the	1995	OHS.	The	Industrial	Council	Digest	contains	key	
information	on	the	 industrial	councils	that	operated	in	the	South	African	labour	market	
in	1992.	 It	provides	the	name	of	 the	 industrial	council,	 the	trade	union	and	employer	
organisations	that	were	party	to	the	council,	the	scope	of	the	council,	the	geographical	
area	 the	council	covered,	and	 in	some	 instances	 the	number	of	employees	covered	
by	 the	council.	The	Digest	also	 indicates	whether	 the	council	had	become	 inactive.	
The	 information	on	the	scope	of	 the	councils	was	used	to	 identify	which	sectors	and	
occupations	 industrial	councils	covered.	The	Digest	was	 therefore	 the	source	of	 the	
occupation,	industry	and	geographical	area	covered	by	an	industrial	council.			
The	1995	OHS	contains	 information	on	the	occupation,	 industry	and	the	work	district	
of workers. These are captured by the three digit International Standard Classification 
of	Occupations	(ISCO	88)	codes,	two	digit	Compact	Economic	Sector	Codes	and	three	
digit	district	code.	The	occupation	categories	in	the	OHS	are	broad	and	do	not	include	
specific job titles as in the LFS. The industry categories in the OHS are also broader 
than	those	in	the	LFS,	as	it	 is	recorded	by	a	two	digit	code	and	not	the	more	detailed	
three	digit	code.	This	meant	 that	 the	occupations	and	 industries	used	 to	estimate	
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industrial	council	coverage	 in	1995	may	have	 included	occupations	and	sub-sectors	
which	fell	outside	the	 industrial	council	system	in	1995.	Our	estimation	of	 the	number	




following	 the	example	of	Butcher	&	Rouse	(2001)	 it	was	assumed	 that	agreements	




Councils,	 but	 according	 to	 the	 Digest	 none	 of	 these	 councils	 published	 Main	
Agreements	 that	prescribed	wages.	They	were	therefore	excluded	from	the	analysis.	





Bargaining	 council	 coverage	 for	 2005	was	 calculated	 in	 a	manner	 similar	 to	 the	







Similar	 to	 the	OHS,	 the	LFS	records	 information	on	 the	occupation	and	 industry	of	
workers.	The	LFS	contains	a	more	detailed	 level	of	 information	 than	 the	OHS,	with	
industry	 captured	by	 the	 three	digit	Standard	 Industrial	Classification	 (SIC)	 code	
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of	Occupations	 (SASCO)	code.	 In	addition,	 the	area	of	 residence	of	 the	worker	 is	
captured,	but	not	the	work	district.	
As noted above, the scope of a bargaining council is defined by sector, area and/or 
occupation	groups.	Using	this	information	for	each	bargaining	council	we	were	able	to	
estimate	bargaining	council	coverage	for	the	workforce	in	the	LFS.	In	terms	of	obtaining	
the	 scope	 of	 each	 bargaining	 council,	 three	main	 sources	 of	 data	were	 utilised,	




possible	 to	accurately	match	all	 job	 titles	 listed	 in	 the	agreements	 to	 the	occupation	
titles	in	the	code	list	of	the	LFS.	If	a	job	title	could	not	be	matched	with	an	appropriate	
occupational	 title	 (either	exactly	 the	same	title	or	where	certain	key	words	were	 the	
same)	 they	were	not	 included	 in	 the	coverage.	Fortunately	 this	only	happened	 in	a	
very	small	number	of	cases	(more	 information	can	be	 found	 in	 the	Technical	Notes	
in Appendix D). Where a bargaining council is regional in scope, the area is defined 





Finally,	 there	are	 the	 two	 issues	of	exemptions	 from	bargaining	council	agreements,	
and	extensions	of	agreements	 to	non-parties.	Again,	 it	was	 impossible	 to	capture	
the	exemptions	granted	 from	provisions	of	 the	bargaining	councils.	 In	 terms	of	 the	
extensions of agreements, we are fairly confident that most of these were included in 
the	estimation	of	coverage.	For	 the	majority	of	bargaining	councils	we	were	able	 to	
obtain	Government	Gazette	Notices.	A	bargaining	council	agreement	is	only	published	
in	a	Government	Gazette	 if	 the	Minister	has	given	permission	that	 it	can	be	extended	
to	non-parties,	meaning	 that	all	employers	and	employees	 in	 that	 industry,	area	or	
occupation	group	are	covered	by	the	agreement.			
7	 The	Actual	Wage	Rates	Database	(AWARD)	is	managed	by	the	Labour	Research	Service	and	contains	information	
on	wage	 and	 conditions	 of	 employment	 in	 the	 formal	 economy.	 It	 also	 contains	 information	 of	 some	 of	 the	wage	
agreements	concluded	in	bargaining	councils.	For	more	information	see	http://award.lrs.org.za/home.php
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Ultimately,	 though,	 through	 the	 above,	we	were	 able	 to	 derive	 a	 uniquely	 coded	
representation	of	Bargaining	Councils	and	 its8	membership	 for	all	workers	employed	
in	1995	and	2005.	In	doing	so,	 this	constructed	dataset	provides	for	a	crucial	point	of	
departure into our ability to analyse the nature and influence of this particular labour 
market	institution.
 4.2 Bargaining Council Membership, Employment and Earnings:
 A Descriptive Overview
Table	1	provides	a	snapshot	of	 the	changes	 in	 the	 labour	market	between	1995	and	















Broad Labour Force 13,754 20,100 6,346 46.14
Employment 9,515 12,301 2,786 29.28
Broad Unemployment 4,239 7,800 3,561 84.01
Employed:
Formal 8,120 8,039 -81 -1
Non-formal











Our definition of non-formal sector employment includes all workers that are either in 
the	 informal	sector10, self-employed or domestic workers. This definition is not strictly 
	 In	 the	remainder	of	 this	document,	 the	 term	bargaining	council	will	be	used	 to	 refer	 to	both	 industrial	councils	and	
bargaining	councils.
9	 Those	between	5	and	65	years	of	age	that	are	willing	and	able	to	work	(including	discouraged	workseekers).
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accurate	 in	 terms	of	conventional	 labour	market	analysis	as	 it	 includes	the	(formally)	
self-employed	 in	 the	non-formal	sector,	but	 it	allows	us	 to	group	 together	all	 those	
workers	 that	 fall	outside	 the	coverage	of	 the	bargaining	council	system.	However,	
it	 should	be	noted	 that	 the	OHS	1995	did	not	adequately	capture	 informal	sector	
employment,	and	therefore	it	 is	not	possible	to	 identify	the	informally	employed	in	this	
survey. Therefore, the non-formal employment figure for 1995 only includes domestic 
workers11	and	the	self-employed.		
Though	 the	 figures	are	not	directly	comparable	due	 to	 the	data	 issues	highlighted	
above,	we	 can	 see	 that	 the	 number	 of	workers	 in	 formal	 employment	 remained	
relatively	stable	between	1995	and	2005,	at	 just	over	eight	million.	The	large	increase	
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Table 2:  Estimated Bargaining Council Coverage, 1995 and 2005
1995 2005
Total Formal Employment 8,120,279 8,039,401
Total BC Coverage 1,193,597 2,580,331
Total BC Coverage (% of Total Formal Employment) 14.70% 32.10%
Private Sector Bargaining Council Coverage 1,193,597 1,072,399
Private Sector BC Coverage (% of Total Formal Employment) 14.70% 13.34%
Government Bargaining Council Coverage 1,507,932
Government BC Coverage (% of Total Formal Employment) 18.76%
Source:	OHS	1995,	LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
When	considering	 the	private	sector	bargaining	councils,	 in	both	years,	 the	 largest	
bargaining	 council	 coverage	 was	 accounted	 for	 by	 four	 key	 industries,	 namely	
metal	and	engineering,	 the	motor	 industry	 (which	 includes	vehicle	and	component	
manufacturing,	 retail	and	 repair,	as	well	as	 retail	of	 fuel),	 the	clothing	 industry	and	
construction.12 In 1995, the textile industry accounted for the fifth largest bargaining 
council coverage. Together the top five industries accounted for 10,5 percent of total 
coverage.	In	2005,	the	textile	industry	was	replaced	by	the	councils	for	the	road	freight	








bargaining	council	 coverage	 in	 the	Manufacturing	sector	had	declined	slightly,	 to	
just	below	500	000	–	down	 from	almost	600	000	 in	1995.	This	 is	 in	contrast	 to	 the	


























in	 the	Wholesale	and	Retail	Trade	sector.	Bargaining	council	 coverage	 increased	





and	2005,	with	 the	 increase	partly	driven	by	 the	50	000	workers	belonging	 to	 the	
Transnet	bargaining	council.	The	share	of	workers	 in	 this	sector	covered	by	councils	
increased	from	about	18	percent	to	almost	42	percent.	Membership	of	the	State	Owned	
Enterprise’s bargaining council significantly changed the occupational composition in 
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of	government)	were	employed	 in	 this	sector.	This	also	accounts	 for	 the	 increased	
share	and	number	of	Professionals	covered	by	bargaining	councils	 in	 this	sector.	 In	
1995,	42	percent	of	 the	workers	 in	 the	CSPS	sector	covered	by	bargaining	councils	
were	Professionals.	In	absolute	terms	this	amounted	to	only	10	000	workers.	By	2005,	
Professionals	accounted	for	52	percent	of	coverage	in	this	sector,	which	is	an	increase	
of	 ten	percentage	points.	 In	absolute	numbers,	however,	 the	 increase	was	huge,	with	
more	 than	700	000	Professionals	covered	by	bargaining	councils	 in	2005.	Overall,	
Professionals	 increased	 their	share	 in	 total	bargaining	council	 coverage	 from	 two	
percent	 to	30	percent	–	driven	largely	by	the	 increase	in	the	number	of	Professionals	
covered in the CSPS sector. The second sector that benefited significantly from the 
increase	 in	 the	bargaining	council	membership	of	public	sector	Professionals,	was	
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1995 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Managers 2005 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
1995 0.3 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 42.1 1.9
Professionals 2005 1.0 0.1 2.1 3.4 26.9 51.9 28.9
1995 4.4 0.0 10.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.6
Clerical Workers 2005 4.9 2.0 7.4 9.3 28.3 12.5 10.2
1995 0.0 0.0 55.5 0.0 0.0 43.9 13.5
Service & Sales Workers 2005 1.1 0.6 41.1 5.3 7.6 16.7 15.0
1995 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Skilled Agriculture
& Fishing Workers 2005 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3
1995 28.0 70.6 32.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.9
Craft & Trade Workers 2005 37.0 70.4 37.4 8.4 1.9 2.7 17.2
1995 51.7 4.7 0.5 96.0 0.0 2.7 32.8
Operators & Assemblers 2005 36.6 3.5 3.3 62.0 2.6 2.4 13.3
1995 15.6 19.8 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 11.8
Elementary Workers 2005 19.4 23.4 7.7 11.5 32.7 13.6 15.0
1995 591,321 230,279 271,370 76,188 1,192 23,248 1,193,597
BC members 2005 486,583 114,228 332,664 179,200 84,124 1,358,171 2,580,331
1995 1,362,063 374,420 1,367,718 431,020 530,455 2,117,455 8,120,279
Formal Employment 2005 1,394,240 536,160 1,630,919 429,091 1,087,271 1,901,858 8,039,401
1995 43.41 61.50 19.84 17.68 0.22 1.10 14.70BC as share of
Formal Employment 2005 35.72 30.51 24.32 41.58 15.86 64.14 31.78
1995 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Private Sector BC (%) 2005 96.5 73.8 94.8 89.7 19.6 1.9 41.6
1995 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Public Sector BC (%) 2005 3.5 26.2 5.2 10.3 80.4 98.1 58.5
Source:		 OHS	1995,	LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Notes:	 Private	Households,	Agriculture,	Mining	and	Utilities	were	omitted	from	the	table,	but	included	in		 	
 figures for total employment and total bargaining council coverage.
	 A	small	number	of	Domestic	Workers	were	recorded	as	working	in	Financial	and	Commercial		 	
	 Services	in	1995.	The	occupation	category	was	omitted	from	the	table,	but	these	workers		 	





2005	was	dominated	by	the	huge	 increase	 in	 the	number	of	Professionals	belonging	
to	bargaining	councils,	 from	 just	over	20	000	 in	1995	 to	more	 than	 three-quarters	
of	a	million	 in	2005.	This	 is	a	consequence	of	 the	establishment	of	 the	public	sector	
bargaining	councils.	 In	1995,	almost	half	of	Professionals	belonging	 to	bargaining	
councils	were	employed	in	the	Construction	industry,	while	43	percent	were	employed	
in	 the	CSPS	sector.	A	 further	seven	percent	belonged	 to	bargaining	councils	 in	 the	
Manufacturing	sector.	By	2005,	more	 than	94	percent	of	Professional	bargaining	
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bargaining	councils	 in	 the	Manufacturing	 industry	decreased	from	48	percent	 to	nine	
percent,	while	 the	share	of	Clerks	 that	belonged	to	bargaining	councils	 in	 the	Trade	
sector	declined	from	52	percent	to	9	percent.	Over	the	same	period,	the	share	of	Clerks	
employed	 in	 the	CSPS	 increased	 from	zero	 to	65	percent.	This	share	 is	dominated	
by	Clerks	working	 in	 the	public	sector.	Overall,	bargaining	council	coverage	 in	 this	
occupation group increased from almost five percent of total employment to more than 
23	percent.
The	number	of	Service	and	Sales	Workers	belonging	to	bargaining	councils	more	than	
doubled	from	about	161	000	 in	1995	to	almost	387	000	 in	2005.	 In	2005,	almost	58	
percent	of	these	workers	were	public	sector	bargaining	councils.	Most	of	the	Services	
Workers	covered	by	bargaining	councils	 in	1995	were	employed	 in	 the	Wholesale	
and	Retail	Trade	industry.	This	share	declined	to	35	percent	in	2005,	with	the	share	of	
Service	Workers	employed	in	the	CSPS	increasing	from	six	percent	to	59	percent.	This	
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Table 4:  Bargaining Council Coverage by Occupation Group and Sector – % Share of   
 Occupation Group 
Source:		 OHS	1995,	LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Notes:	 Private	Households,	Agriculture,	Mining	and	Utilities	were	omitted	from	the	table,	but	included	in		 	
 figures for total employment and total bargaining council coverage.
	 A	small	number	of	Domestic	Workers	were	recorded	as	working	in	Financial	and	Commercial		 	
	 Services	in	1995.	The	occupation	category	was	omitted	from	the	table,	but	these	workers		 	
 were included in the total employment figure.
	
There	was	a	slight	decline	between	1995	and	2005	in	the	number	of	covered	Operators	
and	Assemblers.	 In	 1995,	 the	majority	 of	 these	 workers	 were	 employed	 in	 the	
Manufacturing	sector	with	the	share	of	Operators	in	this	sector	declining	to	52	percent	




employed	 in	 the	Manufacturing	sector.	While	 the	total	number	of	Elementary	workers	
council-covered	increased	from	141	000	to	388	000,	the	share	of	Elementary	workers	
within	Manufacturing,	declined	to	24	percent.	There	was	a	similar	decline	in	the	share	
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Table	 5	 shows	 the	 union	membership	 inside	 and	 outside	 the	 bargaining	 council	
environment	in	1995	and	2005.16	
Table 5:  Bargaining Council Status and Union Membership, 1995 and 2005
Bargaining Council Non-Bargaining Council Formal Employment
Union Non-Union Total Union Non-Union Total Union Non-Union Total
1995 466,827 726,770 1,193,597 2,274,483 4,652,199 6,926,682 2,741,311 5,378,968 8,120,279
39.11% 60.89% 100% 32.84% 67.16% 100% 33.76% 66.24% 100%
2005 1,407,344 1,172,987 2,580,331 1,609,057 3,850,012 5,459,070 3,016,401 5,023,000 8,039,401
54.54% 45.46% 100% 29.47% 70.53% 100% 37.52% 62.48% 100%
Source:		 OHS	1995,	LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
In	 1995,	 about	 40	 percent	 of	workers	 (just	 fewer	 than	 half	 a	million	 employees)	
estimated	to	be	covered	by	a	bargaining	council,	were	also	members	of	a	trade	union.	
This	means	that	the	majority	of	the	workers	that	belonged	to	bargaining	councils	were	
not	members	of	a	union.	By	2005	 this	share	has	 increased	 to	almost	55	percent,	
with	 the	actual	number	of	workers	belonging	 to	both	a	bargaining	council	and	union	






patterns	of	 institutionalised	wage	formation	 in	post-apartheid South Africa. In the first 
instance	the	 level	of	 institutionalised	wage	bargaining,	outside	of	union	membership,	
only covered 15 percent of workers in 1995. A decade later this figure, although more 
than	doubling,	 stood	only	at	32	percent.	Put	differently,	 the	system	of	bargaining	
councils	 in	South	Africa	designed	 to	 formalise	 the	 relationship	between	organised	
workers and employers with regard to wages; benefits; dispute resolution and other 
aspects	of	 labour	market	regulation,	remains	relatively	weak	and	unrepresentative	at	
the	national	 level.	That	being	said,	a	second	key	conclusion	 from	the	above	 is	 that,	
the 1995-2005 period reflects a rapid rise in the bargaining council system for the 
6	 Note	that	while	the	bargaining	council	membership	was	estimated	for	both	years,	the	union	membership	is	based	on	
the	responses	to	very	specific	questions	in	the	995	OHS	and	the	2005	LFS.
7	 The	 key	 public	 sector	 trade	 unions	 are	 the	 National,	 Education,	 Health	 and	 Allied	 Workers’	 Union	 (NEHAWU),	
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public	sector.	Driven	by	the	formalisation	of	 teachers,	nurses	and	other	public	sector	
































20	 Nominal	 earnings	were	 converted	 into	 real	 earnings	 (expressed	 in	 2000	 prices)	 using	 the	Consumer	 Price	 Index	
(StatsSA,	2006).
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environment	 is	not	statistically	significant.	 In	1995,	 the	only	statistically	significant	
difference	 in	 earnings	 are	 for	Asian	 workers,	 with	 employees	 not	 belonging	 to	
a	bargaining	council	actually	earning	almost	one	and	a	half	 times	more	 than	 their	
counterparts	who	were	members	of	a	bargaining	council.	
Table 6:  Real Mean Monthly Earnings by Race, Gender and Bargaining   
   Council Membership, 1995 and 2005










African 2043.32 2076.94 1:1.02 2996.83 2158.82 1:0.72* 46.66** 3.94
Coloured 2312.64 2070.22 1:0.90 3225.45 2794.53 1:0.87 39.47** 34.99**
Asian 2842.48 4001.30 1:1.41* 3908.88 3427.78 1:0.88 37.52 -14.33
White 5680.86 6221.95 1:1.10 5618.87 6961.31 1:1.24* -1.09 11.88
Male 2953.47 3142.55 1:1.06 3396.83 3398.64 1:1.00 15.01** 8.15
Female 1842.82 2695.76 1:1.46* 3499.99 3038.92 1:0.87 89.93** 12.73
Total 2674.38 2982.25 1:1.12 3438.74 3271.79 1:0.95 28.58** 9.71
Source:			 OHS	1995,	LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA)
Notes: * Difference between mean wages significant at the five percent level
 ** Changes significant at the 5 percent level
In	2005,	however,	African	employees	covered	by	a	bargaining	council	agreement	
earned significantly more than those workers not belonging to a bargaining council, 
driven by a statistically significant increase of 47 percent in real earnings between 
1995	and	2005.	The	differences	in	the	earnings	of	Coloured	and	Asian	workers	inside	
and outside the bargaining council environment are not statistically significant. It is 
interesting	 to	note	 that	White	workers	who	did	not	belong	 to	a	bargaining	council	
earned	more	 than	 those	 that	were	covered	by	a	bargaining	council	agreement,	with	
the difference statistically significant. This is probably a reflection of the relatively large 
share	of	White	workers	 in	highly	skilled	occupations	 falling	outside	 the	bargaining	
council	system.




significant.	 In	 2005	 the	 earnings	 of	Males	 and	Females	 belonging	 to	 bargaining	
councils	were	not	statistically	different	from	those	not	covered	by	a	bargaining	council	
agreement. However, female bargaining council members saw a statistically significant 
increase	 of	 almost	 90	 percent	 in	 their	mean	 earnings	 between	 1995	 and	 2005.	
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This	 reflects	 the	 large	 number	 of	 nurses	 and	 female	 teachers	 covered	 by	





more	 than	 their	colleagues	 in	 the	private	sector	as	well	as	 the	 formally	employed	
who	did	not	belong	to	bargaining	councils.	 In	both	cases	the	difference	 is	statistically	
significant, with public sector bargaining council members earning about 30 percent 
more	than	workers	not	part	of	any	bargaining	council,	while	the	difference	was	almost	
90	percent	between	the	public	and	private	sector	bargaining	council	members.	
Table 7:  Real Mean Monthly Earnings by Race, Gender:  Private vs Public Sector Bargaining 
 Council Membership, 2005





African 2158.82 1738.45 3829.55 1:2.20* 1:1.77*
Coloured 2794.53 2510.62 4017.41 1:1.60* 1:1.44*
Asian 3427.78 3382.69 4582.80 1:1.35 1:1.34
White 6961.31 4481.74 6220.84 1:1.39* 1:0.89
Male 3398.64 2560.05 4296.07 1:1.68* 1:1.26*
Female 3038.92 1521.38 4220.95 1:2.77* 1:1.39*
Total 3271.79 2286.87 4257.43 1:1.86* 1:1.30*
Source:		 LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA)
Notes: * Difference between mean wages significant at the 5 percent level
African workers benefited most from being members of the public sector bargaining 







were statistically significant, with the public sector workers earning almost 40 percent 
more.	The	difference	 in	earnings	between	White	workers	belonging	 to	a	bargaining	
council and those within a public sector bargaining council is not statistically significant. 
In terms of our gender estimates, females benefited most from public sector bargaining 
council	membership,	with	 these	workers	 earning	almost	 three	 times	as	much	as	
females	belonging	to	private	councils	and	almost	40	percent	more	than	females	who	
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did	not	belong	to	any	bargaining	council.	Men	who	belonged	to	public	sector	bargaining	
councils	earned	on	average	about	 two-thirds	more	than	those	 in	private	councils	and	
almost a third more than males not within a bargaining council. Overall, this reflects the 
premium	earned	by	professionals	such	as	nurses	and	teachers	and	to	a	lesser	extent,	
police officers in the public sector. 
Table	8	examines	 real	mean	monthly	earnings	by	bargaining	councils	 status	and	
occupation	group.	The	only	occupation	group	where	bargaining	council	workers	earned	
more	 in	both	years	than	those	not	covered	 is	unskilled	Elementary	Workers,	with	 the	
differences statistically significant. Elementary Workers not part of a bargaining council 
earned	about	60	percent	of	the	average	wage	of	a	bargaining	council	member	in	1995,	
and	about	56	percent	of	the	average	wage	of	a	bargaining	council	member	in	2005.			
In 2005, the only other occupation category that benefited from being covered by a 
bargaining	council	agreement	were	Service	and	Sales	Workers,	whose	earnings	were	
almost	double	those	of	non-bargaining	council	service	workers.	This	can	be	attributed	to	
the fact that police officers and correctional services workers (who fall in this category), 
were	covered	by	the	new	public	sector	bargaining	councils	 in	2005	but	uncovered	 in	
1995.
 Table 8:  Real Mean Monthly Earnings by Occupation and Bargaining
 
      Council Membership, 1995 and 2005








Managers 5737.10 8854.87 1:1.54* 3444.90 9578.95 1:2.78* -39.95 8.18
Professionals 7827.58 5505.90 1:0.70* 5345.21 6553.86 1:1.23* -31.71** 19.03
Clerks 2941.33 3029.92 1:1.03 3868.12 3273.02 1:0.85 31.51** 8.02
Service Workers 2239.59 2479.59 1:1.11 3006.73 1597.00 1:0.53* 34.25 -35.59**
Skilled Agr.
Workers 2521.79 2120.47 2750.13 1:1.30 9.05
Craft & Trade
Workers 3091.59 3267.50 1:1.06 2452.81 2219.72 1:0.90 -20.66 -32.07**
Operators &
Assemblers 2436.65 2082.94 1:0.85* 2379.27 2121.28 1:0.89 -2.35 1.84
Elementary
Workers 1665.31 993.96 1:0.60* 2042.01 1149.60 1:0.56* 22.62 15.66**
Total 2674.38 2982.25 1:1.12 3438.74 3271.79 1:0.95 28.58** 9.71
Source:		 	OHS	1995,	LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA)
Notes: * Difference between mean wages significant at the 5 percent level
 ** Changes significant at the 5 percent level
Operators	and	Assemblers	covered	by	a	bargaining	council	agreement	earned	more	
than	those	outside	bargaining	councils	in	1995,	with	the	difference	no	longer	statistically	
significant in 2005. In 1995, the very small number of Professionals who belonged to a 
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in	both	years,	Service	Workers	 in	1995,	and	 for	Agricultural	Workers	 in	2005,	 the	
differences in the levels of earnings are not statistically significant.  
In	 Table	 9	 we	 again	 compare	 the	 earnings	 of	 workers	 part	 of	 the	 public	 sector	
bargaining	councils	with	 the	earnings	of	 those	who	were	members	of	private	sector	
bargaining	councils	 in	2005.	Professionals	 in	 the	public	sector	bargaining	council	
earned	on	average	almost	50	percent	more	than	their	counterparts	that	belonged	to	the	
private	sector	councils.	However,	Professionals	who	did	not	belong	to	any	bargaining	
council	still	earned	more	 than	 the	public	sector	Professionals.	Nurses	and	 teachers	
belong	to	the	public	sector	bargaining	councils,	and	this	could	account	for	the	earnings	
gap	between	the	private	and	public	sector	bargaining	councils.	However,	high	earning	
Professionals	such	as	chartered	accountants,	actuaries	and	 lawyers	 in	 the	private	
sector	do	not	belong	 to	bargaining	councils,	hence,	suggesting	why	Professionals	
outside	the	bargaining	council	environment	have	the	highest	mean	earnings.	
Table 9:  Real Mean Monthly Earnings by Occupation Group:  Private versus Public Sector  
 Bargaining Council Membership, 2005
Non-BC Private BC Public BC
Ratio




Professionals 6553.86 3484.41 5382.01 1:1.54* 1:0.82*
Clerks 3273.02 3010.72 4103.71 1:1.36 1:1.25*
Service Workers 1597.00 1904.62 3799.76 1:2.00* 1:2.38*
Skilled Agr Workers 2750.13 2120.47 1:0.77
Craft & Trade Workers 2219.72 2458.70 2412.40 1:0.98 1:1.09
Operators & Assemblers 2121.28 2218.76 3189.78 1:1.44 1:1.50
Elementary Workers 1149.60 1968.76 2091.25 1:1.06 1:1.82*
Total 3271.79 2286.87 4257.43 1:1.86* 1:1.30*
Source:			 LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA)
Notes: * Difference between mean wages significant at the 5 percent level
The	mean	earnings	of	Service	Workers	in	the	public	sector	were	double	that	of	Service	
Workers	that	belonged	to	private	sector	bargaining	councils	and	almost	two-and-a-half	
times more than that of their colleagues outside the council system. This reflects the 
wage premium earned by police officers and prison wardens in the public sector. 
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When	earnings	are	differentiated	by	 industry	(Table	10),	 it	 is	clear	 that	 in	most	cases	
differences	 in	earnings	between	workers	covered	by	bargaining	councils	and	 those	




Table 10:  Real Mean Monthly Earnings by Industry and Bargaining Council Status, 
    1995 and 2005










Agriculture 789.32 1707.75 950.03 1:0.56* 20.36
Mining & Quarrying 3176.01 2820.05 3310.10 1:1.17 4.22
Manufacturing 2680.99 3870.90 1:1.44* 2298.83 3819.50 1:1.66* -14.25 -1.33
Utilities 4384.73 2956.54 4585.29 1:1.55 4.57
Construction 2658.29 2531.11 1:0.95 2319.21 2066.21 1:0.89 -12.76 -18.37
Wholesale & Retail Trade 2612.20 2457.50 1:0.94 2235.11 2377.66 1:1.06 -14.44 -3.25
Transport 2529.67 4045.35 1:1.60* 2603.98 4587.15 1:1.76* 2.94 13.39
Financial & Business
Services 1153.98 4570.14 1:3.96* 4070.34 4689.15 1:1.15 252.72** 2.60
Commercial, Social
& Prof Services 3953.48 3628.25 1:0.92 4317.75 4602.46 1:1.07 9.21 26.85**
Total 2674.38 2982.25 1:1.12 3438.74 3271.79 1:0.95 28.58** 9.71
Source:			 OHS	1995,	LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA)
Notes: * Difference between mean wages significant at the five percent level
 ** Changes significant at the five percent level
Bargaining	council	members	 in	 the	Financial	Services	sector	experienced	a	huge	
increase	in	their	mean	earnings	between	1995	and	2005,	driven	again	by	public	sector	
workers	 in	 this	sector	who	 joined	 the	PSCBC.	The	only	sector	wherein	bargaining	




workers	were	covered	by	bargaining	council	agreements	 in	1995,	with	 these	 limited	
to	private	sector	councils.	By	2005,	 this	had	 increased	 to	about	30	percent	of	 total	
formal	employment,	with	 the	 increase	driven	almost	entirely	by	membership	of	 the	
newly	formed	public	sector	bargaining	councils.	The	number	of	private	sector	workers	
covered	by	bargaining	council	agreements	remained	relatively	stable	at	around	1	million	
workers.	Ultimately	 then,	 there	has	been	a	stagnation	 in	growth	of	bargaining	council	
representation	 for	private	sector	employees,	with	aggregate	growth	 in	bargaining	
council	membership	a	 function	entirely	 of	 the	PSBC’s	 formation.	The	descriptive	
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analysis of earnings, in turn, suggests firstly that at the mean, there was no significant 
remunerative	advantage	offered	to	being	associated	with	a	bargaining	council.	Closer	
inspection	of	 the	mean	earnings	of	bargaining	council	members,	however,	 revealed	
significant premia associated with membership of public sector bargaining councils. 
Hence,	the	aggregate	level,	public	sector	bargaining	council	members	not	only	earned	





are	of	course	not	 the	only	 factors	 impacting	on	a	worker’s	earnings.	A	wide	 range	
of variables, including the highest level of education and experience also influence 
earnings.	 In	addition,	 these	variables	 interact	simultaneously	 to	 impact	on	earnings.	
In	 the	 following	section,	 therefore,	we	estimate	a	 range	of	earnings	 functions	 in	an	
attempt	 to	account	 for	 the	simultaneous	 impact	of	 relevant	variables	on	 the	 level	of	
earnings.	 In	addition,	 it	will	allow	us	 to	 isolate	 the	 impact	of	bargaining	council	and	
union	membership	on	earnings.
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 5. Bargaining Council Membership and Wages - 
 A Multivariate Analysis
We	follow	Bhorat	and	Leibbrandt	(2001:	107-129)	 in	setting	up	a	model	which	deals	
with	 the	 three	sequential	stages	 in	 the	 labour	market:	 labour	market	participation,	
employment	and	earnings.	Given	the	high	levels	of	involuntary	unemployment	in	South	
Africa,	they	have	argued	that	it	is	important	to	include	both	labour	market	participation	





process	 whereby	 a	 decision	 was	made	 to	 enter	 the	 labour	market	 or	 not.	 The	
participation	equation,	therefore,	attempts	to	shed	some	light	on	the	factors	 impacting	
on	an	 individual’s	decision	 to	enter	 the	 labour	 force.	We	begin	with	a	 full	sample	of	
potential	 labour	market	participants	and	estimate	a	participation	probit	using,	amongst	
other variables, a number of household specific variables that would impact on an 
individual’s	decision	to	enter	the	labour	market.	Once	the	participants	are	determined,	
an	employment	probit	model	 is	estimated,	conditional	on	 labour	 force	participation.	
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to	 understand	 the	 impact	 of	 different	 covariates	 –	 particularly	 that	 of	 union	 and	
bargaining	council	membership	–	at	different	points	on	the	conditional	wage	distribution.	
Put differently, whether bargaining council membership is significant in shaping earnings 
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The	above	 then	provides	 the	solution	 for	 the	ith	quantile,	where	0<i<1,	allowing	





 is	 the	kx1	vector	of	 independent	variables	and	
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earnings.	 In	order	 to	achieve	this,	 the	quantile	regression	approach	can	be	extended	
to	estimate	a	set	of	 inter-quantile	 regressions,	where	 the	dependent	variable	 is	 the	
difference	between	 the	 two	quantiles	 (See	Bhorat	&	Oosthuizen,	2006).	The	 inter-
quantile	approach	takes	the	following	form:





 refer to the specific quantiles or percentiles for the dependent 
variable,	Y
i  




) therefore represents the influence of the percentile 
difference	in	the	independent	variable	on	the	dispersion	in	the	dependent	variable.22	The	
coefficients indicate if a variable is significant or not and if the variable is significantly 
different	from	zero,	its	sign	indicates	whether	it	increases	or	reduces	the	distribution	in	
wages across the two selected percentiles. In our analysis the coefficients will indicate 





















union	dummy	 is	simply	one	 for	union	members	and	zero	 for	non-union	members.23	
Standard	controls	for	race,	gender,	education,	location,	industry,	occupation,	experience	
and	hours	worked	per	month	are	 included	 in	 the	equation.	For	2005	only,	 in	order	 to	
capture	 the	effect	of	public	sector	versus	private	sector	employment	and,	 therefore,	
the	 impact	of	 the	public	sector	bargaining	councils,	 two	dummies	are	 included	for	 the	
Commercial,	Social	and	Personal	Services	(CSPS)	sector.	This	was	done,	given	that	
88	percent	of	people	who	worked	 in	 the	three	spheres	of	government	and	estimated	
as	belonging	 to	 the	public	sector	bargaining	councils	were	coded	as	employees	 in	
that	sector.	Two	separate	dummies	were	therefore	created,	 for	public	sector	workers	
in	the	CSPS	sector	and	for	people	employed	in	the	private	CSPS	sector	respectively.	
This serves as the first specification for the earnings function for 2005. The second 
specification retains a single dummy representing the CSPS sector. In order to capture 
the	 impact	of	 the	private	and	 the	public	sector	bargaining	councils	separately,	 two	
dummies	are	included	in	this	earnings	function,	representing	private	sector	bargaining	
council	membership	and	public	sector	bargaining	council	membership	respectively.			
Table	11	presents	 the	earnings	 function	 for	all	 those	 in	 formal	employment	 in	1995.	
Looking at the second last variable first, the coefficient for the inverse Mills ratio (empl_
lambda) is negative and statistically significant, suggesting the presence of sample 
selection	bias,	which	was	corrected	for.	In	other	words,	the	sample	of	earners	was	not	a	
random	selection	drawn	from	the	pool	of	potential	labour	market	participants	in	1995.
Statistically	 significant	 coefficients	 for	 all	 three	 race	 groups	 indicate	 that	African	
workers	 in	 the	 formal	economy	were	 likely	 to	earn	 less	 than	workers	 from	the	other	
race	groups	in	1995,	with	the	differential	particularly	large	when	their	average	earnings	




on the dependent variable should be calculated as (ее  - 1), with е the coefficient estimate (Halvorsen & Palmquist, 1980: 
7-75).
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are	compared	to	those	of	White	workers.	Being	female,	as	opposed	to	male,	reduced	
earnings	by	about	23	percent	 for	 those	 in	 formal	employment.	The	education	splines	
show	that	higher	 levels	of	education	were	associated	with	higher	earnings	 in	1995.	
As	expected,	 those	 formally	employed	 in	urban	areas	earned	more	 than	 their	 rural	
counterparts,	by	about	13	percent.	

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Table 11:  Earnings Equation 1995 (Formal Employment)





No education to Incomplete GET (None to Grade 8) 0.0376*
Complete GET (Grade 9 to 11) 0.0966*









Craft and Trade Workers 0.2498*





Wholesale and Retail Trade -0.1667*
Transport 0.0708*
Finance 0.0034




Log of hours worked per month 0.1331*
Bargaining council/union member 0.0236








Notes: * Significant at the one percent level
 ** Significant at the five percent level
 Other and unspecified categories were omitted from the table
A	set	of	provincial	dummies	were	 included	 in	 the	equation,	but	are	not	presented	
in Table 11. With the exception of Limpopo, for which the coefficient is statistically 
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insignificant,	 those	 residing	 in	 the	other	provinces	 in	1995	earned	 less	 than	 those	
formally	employed	in	Gauteng.
Belonging	to	any	other	occupation	group	than	an	Elementary	Worker	was	associated	
with	higher	average	earnings.	The	 results	 show	 that	 those	 in	 skilled	occupations	
(Managers	and	Professionals)	enjoyed	 the	 largest	differentials,	 followed	by	Skilled	
Agriculture	and	Fishery	Workers	and	Craft	Workers.	Operators	and	Assemblers	and	





and	Private	Households	were	earning	 less	than	workers	 in	 the	Manufacturing	sector,	
with	the	differential	of	0.70	particularly	large	for	workers	in	the	Agricultural	sector.
The	positive	and	 significant	 coefficient	 for	 experience	 indicate	 that	 an	additional	
year	of	experience	generated	a	return	 to	earnings	of	about	3,4	percent	 in	1995.	As	
expected the coefficient for experience squared was negative and significant indicating 
diminishing	returns	to	experience.
Of	particular	interest	for	this	analysis	is	the	impact	of	being	a	member	of	a	bargaining	
council	 or	 a	 union	 on	 earnings.	 The	 coefficient	 of	 the	 bargaining	 council/union	
membership dummy is statistically insignificant, implying that in 1995 a formal sector 
worker	who	was	a	member	of	both	a	bargaining	council	and	a	union	did	not	enjoy	
any	wage	premium	as	a	consequence	of	his/her	membership	of	 the	 two	 institutions.	
However,	workers	within	a	bargaining	council	but	not	union	members	did	enjoy	a	wage	
premium relative to those not covered by a wage agreement. The statistically significant 
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Ultimately,	 this	 result	 for	 1995	 suggests	 that	 bargaining	 councils	 impacted	
significantly on an individual’s mean wages only in the absence of union membership. 
Institutionalised	wage	 formation	 in	1995	 therefore	was	characterised	by	a	strong	
union-wage	 effect	 and	 a	 significant	 (albeit	 lower)	 bargaining	 council	 effect.	 The	
latter,	 importantly,	was	only	 true	for	 those	bargaining	council	members	who	were	not	
unionised.		
Table	 12	 presents	 the	 earnings	 function	 for	 the	 formally	 employed	 in	 2005.	 For	
2005, two specifications of the earnings function were estimated. In tems of the first 
specification, the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio (empl_lambda)	 is	again	negative	
and statistically significant, confirming that there was sample selection bias which was 
corrected	for.
Again, the positive and statistically significant coefficients for the race dummies indicate 
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Table 12:  Earnings Equation 2005 (Formal Employment)
Source:	 LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Notes: * Significant at the one percent level
 ** Significant at the five percent level
 Other and unspecified categories were omitted from the table
The	positive	 returns	 to	education	are	also	again	evident,	with	additional	 years	of	
education	(presented	by	the	education	splines)	 impacting	positively	on	earnings.	The	
greatest	additional	positive	 impact	on	average	earnings	 is	associated	with	Matric	or	a	
degree in 2005. The LFS no longer records information by urban-rural classification, 
but	by	district	and	metropolitan	council.	The	metro	dummy	is	one	for	all	workers	living	
in	metropolitan	municipalities	and	zero	 for	 those	 living	outside	 these	areas	(in	areas	
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run by district municipalities). The positive and significant coefficient for this dummy 




dummies, the coefficients for the Transport and the Financial Services sectors are 
not statistically significant. Formal employees in Agriculture, Construction, Wholesale 
&	Retail	Trade,	as	well	as	Private	Households	earned	 less	relative	 to	 formal	sector	
employees	in	Manufacturing.	Workers	in	Mining	and	Utilities,	on	the	other	hand,	earned	
more than those working in Manufacturing. The statistically significant and positive 
coefficient for the public sector CSPS dummy captures the wage premium enjoyed 
by workers in the public sector. The coefficient for the private sector is negative and 
statistically significant, implying that private sector workers in that sector earned less 
that those employed in the Manufacturing sector. The positive and significant coefficient 
for	experience	 indicates	 that	an	additional	year	of	experience	generated	a	return	 to	
earnings of about 2,4 percent in 2005. Again the negative and significant coefficient for 
experience	squared	indicates	diminishing	returns	to	experience.
A	set	of	provincial	dummies	were	 included	 in	 the	equation,	but	are	not	presented	
in	Table	12.	With	 the	exception	of	 the	Western	Cape	 (for	which	 the	coefficient	 is	
statistically insignificant), the results indicated that in 2005 the formally employed living 
in	any	of	 the	other	seven	provinces	earned	 less	 than	 their	counterparts	 living	 in	 the	
referent	province,	Gauteng.			
We	now	 turn	 to	 the	 three	dummies	 that	capture	 the	effect	of	 institutionalised	wage	
setting in South Africa in the first specification. The coefficient for the bargaining council/
non-union member dummy is statistically insignificant, indicating that a formal sector 
worker	covered	by	bargaining	council	agreement	but	not	a	member	of	a	union,	did	
not enjoy a wage premium in 2005. Both the coefficients for the union membership 
dummy	and	the	bargaining	council/union	member	dummy	are	positive	and	statistically	
significant. Union membership on its own is associated with an earnings premium of 
about 17 percent. The coefficient for the bargaining council/union member dummy 
translates	into	a	return	to	earnings	of	almost	16	percent.	
The	aim	of	 including	two	dummies	for	 the	CSPS	sector	was	to	capture	the	 impact	of	
private	sector	and	public	sector	employment	separately.	 In	2005,	almost	95	percent	
of	workers	 in	 the	public	sector	were	covered	by	bargaining	council	agreements.	The	
positive and significant coefficient for the CSPS public sector dummy does suggest 
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that	being	a	public	sector	worker	 is	associated	with	an	earnings	premium	relative	 to	
a worker in the Manufacturing sector. It does not, however, sufficiently capture the 
impact	of	public	sector	bargaining	council	membership.	The	above	earnings	equation	
was	estimated	with	 the	 two	CSPS	dummies	 replaced	by	a	single	sectoral	dummy,	
and	 the	dummies	 related	 to	union	and	bargaining	council	membership	 replaced	by	
two	dummies,	 for	private	sector	bargaining	council	membership	and	public	sector	
bargaining	council	membership	respectively.	Table	12	also	shows	 the	results	of	 this	
second	specification.	The	magnitudes	and	signs	of	 the	coefficients	 for	 the	control	
variables are almost identical to those in the first specification. The estimated coefficient 
for the CSPS dummy, however, is negative and significant, which was expected given 
the	 results	 from	specification	 (1).	This	 implies	 that	 the	average	earnings	of	CSPS	
workers lagged those found within Manufacturing. The coefficient for the private sector 
bargaining	dummy	 is	 insignificant,	again	 implying	 that	 if	you	worked	 in	 the	private	
sector,	membership	of	a	bargaining	council	did	not	award	you	a	wage	premium	in	2005.	





formation	 in	1995	and	2005.	 It	only	shows	 the	coefficients	which	were	statistically	
significant. The union wage gap is significant in 1995 and for both specifications in 
2005, with the size of the coefficient varying from 17 percent to 23 percent. This implies 
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with membership with a bargaining council did not yield any significant wage premium. A 
decade	later,	however,	the	bargaining	council	system	did	not	offer	individuals	who	were	
not	unionised	any	premium.	 In	contrast,	workers	part	of	both	a	union	and	bargaining	




clearly by the results from the second specification. While system membership of a 
private	sector	bargaining	council	did	not	yield	any	premium,	membership	of	the	public	
sector	bargaining	councils	was	associated	with	a	wage	premium	of	28	percent.	
The results from our multivariate analysis confirm the tentative conclusions from our 
descriptive	overview.	Firstly,	 the	wage	premium	associated	with	union	membership	
remained	 strong	 between	 1995	 and	 2005.	 Indeed,	 the	 estimates	 re-affirm	many	
previous	 union-wage	 premia	 derived	 in	 older	 datasets.	 They,	 therefore,	 confirm	
the	strong	effect	union	membership	continues	 to	have	 in	shaping	and	determining	
mean	wages	 in	the	South	African	 labour	market.	 In	 turn,	however,	our	more	nuanced	
representation	of	 institutionalised	wage	 formation	suggests	 the	Bargaining	Council	
membership	was	also	critical.	In	particular,	it	is	evident	that	public	employees	who	were	
members of PSBC ensured a high and significant return to their earnings in 2005. The 
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importance	of	both	unions	and	bargain	councils	 in	determining	wages	 is	clear	when	
we	consider	 that	a	 joint	premium	of	as	high	as	51	percent	may	be	present	 through	





75th	and	 the	90th	percentile	of	 the	 log	wage	distribution	 in	1995.	This	allows	us	 to	
evaluate	 the	 impact	of	 the	explanatory	variables	on	 the	earnings	of	 formal	sector	
workers	at	these	points	of	the	log	wage	distribution.	
At all five points (and at the mean) of the earnings distribution being African, resulted 
in	 lower	earnings	 relative	 to	 the	other	 three	 race	groups.	The	magnitudes	of	 the	
coefficients vary slightly across the quantiles, but at all points Whites enjoyed the largest 
wage	differential,	 followed	by	Asians	and	Coloureds.	The	negative	and	statistically	
significant coefficients for the female dummy suggest gender discrimination across the 




in	an	urban	area	as	opposed	 to	a	 rural	area	was	associated	with	a	higher	 level	of	
earnings,	 but	 became	 less	 important	 as	we	moved	 towards	 the	 top	 of	 the	wage	
distribution.			
Again,	provincial	dummies	were	 included	 in	 the	equations,	but	are	not	shown	here.	
Workers	living	in	provinces	other	than	Gauteng	generally	earned	less	across	the	wage	
distribution. There are a few exceptions, with the coefficient of the dummy for KwaZulu-
Natal not significant at the 90th percentile, while the coefficients for the Limpopo dummy 
are insignificant at the 25th	and	the	50th percentile. For Limpopo, the coefficients at the 
75th	and	the	90th percentile are positive and significant; implying that these workers at 
the	top	of	the	wage	distribution	earned	more	than	their	colleagues	in	Gauteng.
For Managers, Professionals and Clerks the coefficients are positive and significant 
across	 the	wage	distribution,	with	 the	differentials	 remaining	relatively	stable	across	
the	distribution.	Skilled	Agricultural	workers	enjoyed	a	steady	 increase	 in	 their	wages	
relative	 to	Elementary	Workers	 from	 the	25th	percentile	onwards.	Craft	and	Trade	
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distributions in each sector. The coefficients for experience and experience squared 
are very similar to the coefficients estimated at the mean at the different points of the 
distribution.
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Table 13:  Earnings Functions Estimates, 1995
Quantile ( ) =Dependent Variable:
Log of monthly earnings OLS 0.10 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Coloured 0.196* 0.161* 0.173* 0.149* 0.185* 0.215*
Asian 0.260* 0.272* 0.252* 0.224* 0.254* 0.282*
White 0.556* 0.518* 0.527* 0.535* 0.579* 0.573*
Female -0.230* -0.165* -0.182* -0.205* -0.233* -0.234*
None to Incomplete GET
(None - Grade 8) 0.038* 0.047* 0.046* 0.035* 0.033* 0.031*
Complete GET
(Grade 9 - 11) 0.097* 0.084* 0.081* 0.089* 0.100* 0.100*
Matric (Grade 12) 0.190* 0.199* 0.178* 0.175* 0.174* 0.194*
Diploma 0.153* 0.089** 0.121* 0.168* 0.169* 0.152*
Degree 0.117* 0.090* 0.116* 0.115* 0.140* 0.196*
Urban 0.132* 0.169* 0.146* 0.131* 0.108* 0.086*
Managers 0.726* 0.654* 0.704* 0.705* 0.771* 0.749*
Professionals 0.537* 0.546* 0.564* 0.525* 0.557* 0.554*
Clerks 0.277* 0.305* 0.299* 0.279* 0.267* 0.266*
Service Workers 0.175* 0.091* 0.139* 0.187* 0.244* 0.281*
Skilled Agricultural 0.473* -0.027 0.385* 0.574* 0.679* 0.705*
Craft & Trade Workers 0.250* 0.216* 0.255* 0.252* 0.289* 0.362*
Operators & Assemblers 0.170* 0.190* 0.171* 0.159* 0.165* 0.196*
Agriculture -0.697* -0.661* -0.751* -0.771* -0.752* -0.654*
Mining -0.005 -0.034 -0.046 -0.038 -0.073* -0.038
Utilities 0.157* 0.157** 0.206* 0.157* 0.089 0.115
Construction -0.149* -0.170* -0.196* -0.188* -0.155* -0.139*
Wholesale & Retail Trade -0.167* -0.133* -0.164* -0.188* -0.201* -0.173*
Transport 0.071* 0.173* 0.101* 0.030 0.004 -0.002
Finance 0.003 0.062 0.017 -0.013 -0.037 -0.023
CSPS 0.021 0.091* 0.035 0.000 -0.049** -0.068*
Private Households -0.712* -0.752* -0.827* -0.785* -0.697* -0.551*
Experience 0.034* 0.032* 0.032* 0.032* 0.033* 0.036*
Experience squared -0.001* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
Log of hours (per month) 0.133* 0.243* 0.155* 0.093* 0.079* 0.049**
BC/union member 0.024 0.061 0.030 0.027 -0.022 -0.016
BC/non-union member 0.069* 0.061 0.043** 0.055* 0.059* 0.067**
Union 0.196* 0.301* 0.240* 0.166* 0.144* 0.091*
Emp_lambda -0.115* -0.320* -0.269* -0.208* -0.035 -0.037
Constant 5.374* 4.179* 5.036* 5.762* 6.032* 6.419*
Number Observed 24479 24479 24479 24479 24479 24479
Pseudo R2 0.652 0.4322 0.4543 0.4401 0.4273 0.4026
Source:	 OHS	1995	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Notes: * Significant at the one percent level
 ** Significant at the five percent level
 Other and unspecified categories were omitted from the table
Turning to the coefficients of the dummies that capture bargaining council and union 
membership, the coefficient of the dummy presenting bargaining council membership 
together	with	union	membership	 remain	 insignificant	across	 the	distribution.	This	
means	 that	membership	of	both	a	bargaining	council	and	a	union	at	 the	same	time	
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did	not	have	any	 impact	on	a	 formally	employed	worker’s	earnings	at	any	point	of	
the	wage	distribution	 in	1995.	The	coefficient	of	 the	dummy	capturing	bargaining	
council membership without union membership is not statistically significant at the 
10th percentile. It is, however significant at the 25th,	50th,	75th	and	90th	percentile,	with	
the	magnitude	 increasing	 towards	 the	 top	of	 the	distribution.	This	 implies	 that	at	 the	
very bottom of the wage distribution, workers did not benefit from being a member 
of	a	bargaining	council	 in	1995.	Thus,	 the	bargaining	council	premium	for	non-union	
members is significant for most of the wage distribution and, notably, remains so even 
at	the	90th percentile. Hence, while the OLS estimates confirmed a significant bargaining 
council/non-union	 impact	at	 the	mean,	we	suggest	here	 that	 this	 impact	holds	 true	
across	the	entire	wage	distribution,	barring	those	 individuals	at	 the	10th	percentile.	 In	
addition, the coefficients of the union membership dummy are positive and significant 
across the entire distribution. The fact that the size of the coefficients decline across the 
wage	distribution	suggests,	as	would	be	expected,	that	the	magnitude	of	the	premia	in	
1995	was	highest	amongst	those	workers	in	the	bottom	half	of	the	wage	distribution.	
Given the focus of the paper, the derived coefficients (if statistically significant) for the 
bargaining	council/union,	bargaining	council/non-union	and	union	variables	at	different	
points	 in	 the	wage	distribution	 in	1995	are	shown	 in	Figure	2.	 In	addition,	we	also	
display the mean OLS estimates. In all cases these OLS coefficients are presented 
by the relevant horizontal lines. The coefficient for bargaining council membership in 
combination with union membership is insignificant at all points of the wage distribution, 
and	at	the	mean	as	discussed	above	and	are	therefore	not	included	in	Figure	2.	
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Figure 2:  Estimates of Bargaining Council and Union Membership Impact on Earnings by  































five percent level for the remaining points of the wage distribution. Note, however, 
that	 this	bargaining	council	premium	is	relatively	stable	across	the	entire	distribution,	
varying	between	four	percent	and	eight	percent	suggesting,	 therefore,	 that	 the	 impact	
of	bargaining	council	membership	was	distribution-neutral.
The	 coefficients	 for	 the	dummy	 representing	union	membership	are	positive	and	
statistically significant across the distribution with the exception of the 95th	percentile.	
The estimated coefficients indicate, of course, that union members earned more that 
their	non-unionised	counterparts.	In	addition,	the	downward	trend	implies	that	in	1995,	
relatively	 low-earning	(and	disproportionately	unskilled)	workers	at	 the	bottom	end	of	
the distribution benefited more from belonging to a union than better-earning, higher 
skilled	workers.
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Table	14	compares	 the	OLS	 results	with	 those	at	 the	10th,	25th,	50th,	75th	and	 the	
90th	percentile	of	 the	 log	wage	distribution	 in	2005.	The	 three	dummies	capturing	
institutionalised	 wage	 formation	 are	 private	 sector	 bargaining	 council	 member;	
public	sector	bargaining	council	member	and	union	member,	which	 is	our	preferred	








is not significant at the very top of the distribution. The results by provinces are not 
displayed	 in	Table14.	With	 the	exception	of	 the	Western	Cape	at	 the	10th,	25th,	50th	
and	90th	percentile,	and	the	Eastern	Cape	at	 the	10th percentile, all coefficients for all 
provinces are negative and statistically significant, meaning that workers living outside 
Gauteng	earned	less	than	those	that	resided	in	the	province.
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Table 14:  Earnings Function Estimates, 2005
Source:	 LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Notes: * Significant at the one percent level
 ** Significant at the five percent level
 Other and unspecified categories were omitted from the table
As in 1995, the coefficients for the Managers, Professionals and Clerks are positive 
and significant across the distribution, with the magnitudes relatively stable. This means 
that,	as	expected,	workers	 in	 these	occupation	groups	earned	more	that	Elementary	
Workers across the distribution. The coefficient of the dummy for Service Workers only 
becomes significant at the 50th percentile. The positive coefficients at the 50th,	75th	and	
90th	percentile	mean	that	Service	Workers	in	the	top	half	of	the	wage	distribution	earned	
more than Elementary Workers. The coefficient for agricultural workers is not significant 
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The	 coefficients	 of	 the	 dummies	 that	 capture	 private	 sector	 bargaining	 council	
membership are statistically insignificant at all estimated percentiles of the distribution. 
In	 other	 words,	 workers	 in	 the	 private	 sector	 did	 not	 enjoy	 any	 wage	 premium	
associated	with	membership	 of	 private	 sector	 bargaining	 council	 in	 2005,	 thus,	
reinforcing the OLS estimate. The coefficients for the public sector bargaining council 
membership are positive and significant across the wage distribution. The size of the 
coefficient increases slightly from the 10th	to	the	25th	percentile,	before	declining	towards	
the	top	of	 the	distribution.	Again,	 this	suggests	 that	workers	 in	 the	bottom	half	of	 the	
distribution benefited more from being covered by public sector bargaining council wage 
agreements. The coefficients of the union membership dummy are also again positive 
and significant across the wage distribution. As expected the magnitude of coefficients 






The coefficient for the private bargaining council dummy is statistically insignificant at 
the	mean	as	well	as	across	the	wage	distribution,	with	the	notable	exception	(although	
not	shown	in	Table	14)	of	the	5th percentile. The fact that the coefficient is significant at 
the	5th percentile implies that the only workers in the private sector who benefited from 
belonging	 to	a	bargaining	council	 in	2005	were	 those	at	 the	very	bottom	end	of	 the	





of the nascent public service bargaining councils. The coefficient for the dummy is, thus, 
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increased	from	the	5th	percentile	 to	 the	35th	percentile,	before	declining	to	 the	 lowest	
point	at	the	95th	percentile	(apart	from	a	spike	around	the	60th	and	65th	percentile).
Figure 3:  Estimates of Bargaining Council and Union Membership Impact on Earnings by  























Similar	 to	 the	previous	graph,	 the	coefficient	 for	 the	union	membership	dummy	 is	
positive and statistically significant at the mean as well as across the distribution. The 
union	wage	premium	declined	across	 the	wage	distribution;	with	 the	wage	gap	 for	
unionised	workers	at	the	5th	percentile	almost	double	the	gap	for	the	unionised	workers	
at	the	very	top	of	the	distribution.




premia	 is,	 in	 fact,	higher	 than	 the	union	wage	premia.	This	represents	an	additional	
feature	of	our	 institutionalised	 industrial	system,	namely	 that	not	only	has	there	been	
the	establishment	of	a	highly	organised	public	sector	bargaining	council	system,	 this	
new	labour	market	 institution	has	also	crucially,	been	able	 to	extract	returns	for	 their	
workers	as	high,	or	in	some	cases	higher,	than	those	who	are	members	of	a	union.	This	
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in earnings, specifically between the 90th	and	the	10th	percentiles,	the	90th	and	the	50th	
percentiles and finally the 50th	and	 the	10th	percentiles,	based	on	equation	(3).	The	
results	for	1995	can	be	found	in	Appendix	I,	with	those	for	2005	in	Appendix	J.			
We	are	particularly	 interested	 in	 the	 impact	of	wage	setting	 in	bargaining	councils	
and	unions	on	the	earnings	inequality.	This	may	provide	some	evidence	on	the	extent	
to	which	 institutional	wage	 formation	contributes	 to	 the	 increase	or	decline	 in	wage	
inequality. The coefficients for the dummy representing membership of a bargaining 
council only are insignificant for all three inter-quantile estimates in 1995. This means 
that	 in	1995	wage	agreements	negotiated	 in	bargaining	councils	did	not	contribute	
to	 altering	earnings	 inequality	 between	 the	90th	-10th,	 90th	-	 50th	 and	 the	50th	-10th	
percentiles. This means that there is no significant difference in the wage premium 
associated	with	a	non-union	bargaining	council	member	at	 the	chosen	 interquantiles.	
This is consistent with the fact that at the quantiles, the coefficients did not vary much 
from	each	other	and	from	the	mean.	
The coefficient for the dummy capturing bargaining council – union membership is 
significant (at the five percent level) only for the 90th	-10th	percentile	difference.	This	





The	union	coefficient	 is	significant	at	 the	one	percent	 level	 for	all	 three	percentile	
differentials.	The	negative	coefficient	 implies	 that	 in	1995,	membership	of	a	union	
reduced	wage	 inequality	 between	 the	 90th	 and	 10th	 percentile,	 the	 90th	 and	 50th	
percentile	as	well	as	 the	50th	and	10th	percentile.	The	 impact	was	 largest	 for	 the	50th	
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In 2005, the coefficient for union membership is again significant (at the five percent 
level) for all three percentile differentials. The coefficient is largest for the 50th	-	10th	
percentile,	again	showing	that	 the	reduction	 in	overall	wage	 inequality	was	driven	by	
the	reduction	 in	wage	 inequality	 in	 the	bottom	half	of	 the	distribution.	The	dummies	
representing	membership	of	a	private	and	public	sector	bargaining	council	were	both	




the	wage	distribution,	 it	also	served	to	reduce	wage	 inequality	and	particularly	so	 in	
the	bottom	half	of	 the	wage	distribution.	 In	1995,	 (private	sector)	bargaining	council	
membership	awarded	a	relatively	stable	premium	to	all	wage	earners,	with	no	 impact	
on	wage	 inequality.	 In	2005,	only	membership	of	a	public	sector	bargaining	council	











workers were members of bargaining councils in 1995. Although, this figure had doubled 
to	32	percent	 in	2005,	 this	still	meant	 that	 less	than	a	third	of	 the	formally	employed	
were	covered	by	bargaining	councils.	Closer	 inspection	of	 the	 increase	 in	bargaining	
council	membership	between	1995	and	2005	 revealed	 that	 is	was	almost	entirely	







growth	 in	bargaining	council	coverage	was	 in	 the	State	Owned	Enterprise-related	
sectors.	Overall,	 the	number	of	private	sector	workers	covered	by	bargaining	council	
agreements	remained	relatively	stable	at	around	one	million.	Simply	put,	bargaining	
council membership in the first decade of democracy is characterised by an erosion of 
private	sector	bargaining	council	membership	on	the	one	hand	and	the	rapid	rise	of	this	
system	of	bargaining	in	the	public	sector.
At	 first	 glance,	 there	 did	 not	 appear	 to	 have	 been	 any	 significant	 remunerative	
advantage	associated	with	bargaining	council	membership	 in	either	1995	or	2005.	
Closer	 inspection	 of	 the	mean	earnings	 of	 bargaining	 council	members	 in	 2005,	





Our	multivariate	analysis,	 in	 turn,	allowed	us	 to	 isolate	 the	specific	 impact	of	 the	
membership	of	a	bargaining	council,	union	or	both	on	earnings.	
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The results from this analysis confirmed the tentative conclusions from the descriptive 
overview.	Hence,	 in	1995,	workers	 in	 the	bargaining	council-nonunion	cohort	only	
enjoyed	a	small	wage	premium	 relative	 to	workers	who	were	not	covered	by	any	
institutional	wage	agreement.	Workers	 in	 the	union-bargaining	council	cohort	did	not	
enjoy any significant benefit in terms of average earnings. The establishment of the 
PSCBC, however, resulted in significant wage premia being associated with public 
sector	 bargaining	 council	membership	 in	2005.	The	decline	of	 the	private	 sector	






points	of	 the	wage	distributions	as	well	as	 their	 impact	on	differences	 in	earnings.	 In	
1995	and	2005,	union	membership	not	only	awarded	wage	premia	across	 the	wage	








The	above,	 therefore,	has	attempted	a	detailed	overview	of	 the	nature	of	 the	wage	
formation	and	determination	 in	 the	South	African	 labour	market.	 It	 is	clear	 that,	while	
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Hairdressing and Cosmetology Bargaining Council (KZN)
Bargaining	Council	for	the	Laundry,	Cleaning	and	Dyeing	Industry	(Cape)
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•	 Where	different	 industrial	councils	existed	for	different	areas,	 the	workers	were	
aggregated	into	a	single	‘council’.	This	is	true	for	the	building,	clothing,	electrical,	
furniture,	hairdressing,	 laundry	cleaning	and	dyeing,	and	 liquor	and	catering	
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 Appendix D:  Technical Notes:  Creation of BC Coverage 2005
Fishing	Industry	Bargaining	Council
•	 Wages	of	skipper	 (fisherman)	not	prescribed	 in	 the	BC	Agreement	and	 this	
occupation	group	is	therefore	not	included	in	the	estimated	coverage
•	 Only	91	workers	estimated	to	be	covered	by	the	BC	agreement	in	the	2005	LFS,	




•	 Matching	 the	 information	 from	 the	Government	Gazette	Notice	on	 the	main	
agreement	 for	 the	Canvas	Goods	Industry	(Witwatersrand	and	Pretoria)	 to	 the	




•	 It was difficult to get sufficient occupational information from these agreements 




•	 Individual	 provisions	 have	 been	 made	 for	 different	 parts	 of	 the	 country	
(corresponding to the “old” regional bargaining councils), but for the purposes of 
the	analysis,	country-wide	coverage	was	assumed	
•	 It	was	assumed	 that	 the	same	occupations	are	covered	 in	all	 the	 individual	
provisions	












•	 For	 the	Free	State,	 the		most	recent	 information	was	from	2000,	and	this	was	
used	to	calculate	coverage
•	 There	was	no	occupation	 information	 in	 the	agreement	 for	 the	South	Western	
Districts	–	the	same	occupation	codes	was	used	as	for	the	Eastern	Cape











workers were identified in the LFS
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National	Bargaining	Council	of	the	Leather	Industry	of	SA
•	 For	 the	 footwear	 section,	 the	 LFS	occupation	 codes	were	matched	 to	 the	
occupations	listed	in	the	gazetted	main	agreement
•	 The	 tanning	section	and	 the	general	goods	and	handbags	section	 fall	under	
the	same	industry	code	in	the	LFS,	therefore	these	two	sections	were	grouped	















•	 The	Award	database	only	 listed	 labourer	and	machine	operator	as	occupations	
covered
•	 Only machine operator – tyre production was identified in the LFS
Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Industry 
•	 No	recently	published	information
•	 Only machine operator, refining sugar was included






Manufacturing	 Industry	of	 the	RSA,	BC	for	 the	Worsted	Textile	Manufacturing	
Industry,	SA	Wool	&	Mohair	BC


















•	 Occupation	 and	 industry	 coverage	 from	 Government	 Gazette	 and	 from	
agreement	available	on	BC	website
•	 It	should	be	noted	 that	 there	also	exists	a	National	Bargaining	Forum	for	 the	
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have	been	 included	 in	our	coverage	as	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 identify	 them	in	 the	
LFS.	The	number	of	employees	that	are	listed	under	motor	vehicle	manufacturing	






•	 Caterers	are	covered	by	the	agreement	and	 in	 the	LFS,	a	caterer	 is	coded	as	
Manager
Motor	Ferry	Industry
•	 No	occupation	 information	contained	 in	 the	Government	Gazette,	but	some	 in	
the	Award	database
•	 The	motor	ferry	industry	falls	under	the	same	industry	code	as	the	Road	Freight	




•	 The	 relevant	 industry	 code	 in	 the	LFS	 includes	a	 range	of	 other	activities,	
meaning that the coverage of the BC is significantly overestimated.
SA	Road	Passenger	BC
•	 Very	 little	 information	available	–	only	bus	drivers	 included	 in	 the	estimated	
coverage
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•	 Four BCs in this industry (Semi-national, Pretoria, Cape Peninsula, KwaZulu-
Natal)
•	 No	Government	Gazette	could	be	 found	 for	 the	Cape	Peninsula	BC,	but	 the	
same	occupation	codes	were	used	to	estimate	coverage	for	all	four	councils
Laundry,	Cleaning	&	Dyeing
•	 Two bargaining councils (Cape & KwaZulu Natal) with slightly different 
occupations	covered
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be	covered,	as	 it	 is	 impossible	to	separate	the	senior	management	 from	those	
managers	covered	by	the	BC	agreement
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 Appendix E:  Estimated Industrial Council Coverage in the 



























Total Formal Employment 8,120,279 100
Total BC Coverage 1,193,597
Total BC Coverage (% of Total Formal Employment 15%
Workers not covered by ICs 6,926,682 85.3
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 Appendix F:  Estimated Bargaining Council Coverage in 


































Total Formal Employment 8,039,401 100
Total BC Coverage 2,580,331
Total BC Coverage (% of Formal Employment) 32%
Total BC Coverage – Government (% of Formal 
Employment)
13%
Workers not covered by BCs 5,459,070 67.9
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 Appendix G:  Broad Labour Force Participation Equation, 1995  
     and 2005
1995 2005
Marginal	Effects x-bar Marginal	Effects x-bar
Coloured -0.0246 * 0.1100 -0.0067 0.0894
Asian -0.1458 * 0.0335 -0.1590 * 0.0282
White -0.1702 * 0.1395 -0.1958 * 0.1038
Female -0.2283 * 0.5289 -0.1004 * 0.5187
25-34	years 0.1153 * 0.3232 0.3521 * 0.2687
35-44	years 0.1036 * 0.2459 0.3103 * 0.1772
45-55	years 0.0285 * 0.1471 0.2475 * 0.1326
55-65	years -0.2248 * 0.1030 0.0706 * 0.1005
No	education	to	
incomplete	GET
0.0106 * 6.2797 0.0054 * 6.8834
Complete	GET 0.0157 * 1.2661 0.0138 * 1.5510
Matric 0.0751 * 0.2752 0.1710 * 0.3078
Diploma 0.0852 * 0.0844 0.0378 0.0801
Degree 0.0089 0.0542 -0.0202 0.0646
Urban/Metro 0.0339 * 0.5891 0.0209 * 0.3755
Western	Cape -0.0246 * 0.1230 -0.0295 0.1057
Eastern	Cape -0.0950 * 0.1326 -0.0908 * 0.1346
Northern	Cape -0.0744 * 0.0240 -0.0546 * 0.0191
Free	State 0.0133 0.0685 -0.0708 * 0.0645
KwaZulu Natal -0.0920 * 0.2007 -0.0844 * 0.2046
North	West -0.0607 * 0.0871 -0.0469 * 0.0810
Limpopo -0.0421 * 0.0647 -0.0943 * 0.1068
Mpumalanga -0.1370 * 0.0866 -0.0258 ** 0.0662
No	of	children	under	7	
years	in	hh
-0.0051 * 0.8549 0.0092 * 0.8020
No	of	children	aged	8-15	
yrs	in	hh
-0.0043 ** 0.7973 -0.0320 * 0.8759
No	of	adults	over	60	years	
in	hh









Notes: * Significant at one percent level
 ** Significant at five percent level
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Appendix H:  Formal Employment Equation, 1995 and 2005
1995 2005
Marginal	Effects x-bar Marginal	Effects x-bar
Coloured 0.1837 * 0.1131 0.2207 * 0.0948
Asian 0.2032 * 0.0310 0.2575 * 0.0279
White 0.2324 * 0.1403 0.2671 * 0.1074
Female -0.0549 * 0.4465 -0.1516 * 0.4888
25-34	years 0.0509 * 0.3648 -0.0355 0.3570
35-44	years 0.1465 * 0.2696 0.0388 0.2263
45-55	years 0.1907 * 0.1421 0.1166 * 0.1496
55-65	years 0.3433 * 0.0531 0.2469 * 0.0639
No	education	to	
incomplete	GET
-0.0089 * 6.6017 0.0039 7.0179
Complete	GET 0.0076 1.4162 0.0145 * 1.7300
Matric 0.0333 * 0.3188 0.0600 * 0.3830
Diploma 0.1449 * 0.1030 0.2217 * 0.1034
Degree -0.0744 * 0.0669 -0.0112 0.0821
Urban/Metro -0.0260 * 0.6295 0.0268 * 0.4135
Western	Cape 0.0065 0.1295 0.0531 * 0.1135
Eastern	Cape -0.0848 * 0.1196 -0.0715 * 0.1191
Northern	Cape -0.0561 * 0.0229 -0.0062 0.0191
Free	State -0.0491 * 0.0751 0.0578 * 0.0638
KwaZulu Natal 0.0086 0.1869 -0.0004 0.1922
North	West -0.0095 0.0868 -0.0176 0.0814
Limpopo -0.0313 * 0.0648 -0.0181 0.0660
Mpumalanga -0.0177 0.0734 -0.0732 * 0.0934














Notes: * Significant at one percent level
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Appendix I:  Inter-Quantile Determinants of Earnings, 1995
90th-10th 90th-50th 50th-10th
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Coloured 0.0550 0.0512 ** 0.0038
Asian 0.0595 0.1099 * -0.0505
White 0.0461 0.0266 0.0195








Matric	(Grade	12) -0.0381 0.0012 -0.0394 **
Diploma 0.0518 -0.0387 0.0904 **
Degree 0.0986 * 0.0726 * 0.0260
Urban -0.0898 * -0.0474 * -0.0424 **
Western	Cape 0.0966 * 0.0307 0.0659
Eastern	Cape 0.2226 * 0.0942 * 0.1285 *
Northern	Cape 0.0640 0.0746 -0.0106
Free	State 0.2231 * 0.0958 * 0.1274 *
KwaZulu Natal 0.0885 * 0.0494 0.0391
North	West 0.2045 * 0.0741 * 0.1304 *
Limpopo 0.2323 * 0.1528 * 0.0794 **
Mpumalanga 0.1282 ** 0.0611 ** 0.0672* **
Managers 0.1466 ** 0.0446 0.1020
Professionals -0.0022 -0.0060 0.0038
Clerks -0.0353 -0.0398 0.0045
Service	Workers 0.1638 * 0.0882 * 0.0756* **
Skilled	Agricultural 0.4731 * 0.0784 0.3947 **
Craft	and	Trade	Workers 0.1440 * 0.0769 * 0.0671 **
Operators	and	Assemblers 0.0181 0.0037 0.0143
Agriculture -0.0124 0.0865 -0.0989 *
Mining -0.1190 ** -0.0774 ** -0.0416
Utilities -0.1115 -0.1481 ** 0.0366




Transport -0.1901 * -0.0640 -0.1261 *
Finance	 -0.0732 -0.0017 -0.0715
Commercial,	Social	and	
Personal	Services
-0.1692 * -0.0766 * -0.0926 *
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Private	Households 0.2069 0.2434 ** -0.0366
Experience 0.0031 0.0051 ** -0.0020
Experience	squared 4.22E-06 -6.7E-05 7.07E-05
Log	of	hours	worked	per	
month
-0.1987 * -0.03 -0.1687 *
Bargaining	council/union	
member




Union -0.2294 * -0.0737 * -0.1558 *
Employment	lambda 0.2462 ** 0.1430 0.1032
Constant 2.3470 * 0.6576 * 1.6894 *
Number	of	Observations 24479 24479 24479
High	Quantile	Pseudo	R2 0.3976 0.3976 0.4512
Low	Quantile	Pseudo	R2 0.4286 0.4512 0.4286
Source:	 OHS	1995	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Notes: * Significant at the one percent level
 ** Significant at the five percent level
 Other and unspecified categories were omitted from the table
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Appendix J:  Inter-Quantile Determinants of Earnings, 2005
90-10th 90th-50th 50th-10th
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Coloured 0.066 -0.008 0.074
Asian 0.043 -0.042 0.085
White 0.257** 0.035 0.223*




Complete	GET	(Grade	9	to	11) 0.054** 0.027* 0.027
Matric	(Grade	12) 0.183* 0.104* 0.080
Diploma -0.093 -0.093 0.000
Degree 0.060 0.050** 0.010
Metro -0.026 -0.041 0.015
Western	Cape -0.140** -0.074** -0.067
Eastern	Cape -0.113** -0.024 -0.090
Northern	Cape 0.004 -0.007 0.012
Free	State 0.087 -0.006 0.094
KwaZulu Natal 0.058 -0.021 0.079
North	West -0.040 -0.011 -0.029
Limpopo 0.100** 0.032 0.068
Mpumalanga -0.012 -0.003 -0.010
Managers 0.335* 0.162** 0.172*
Professionals -0.023 -0.049 0.026
Clerks 0.076 -0.033 0.110*
Service	Workers 0.189* 0.044 0.145*
Skilled	Agricultural 0.299** 0.229** 0.070
Craft	and	Trade	Workers 0.102 0.038 0.065
Operators	and	Assemblers 0.022 0.008 0.014
Agriculture -0.412* -0.247* -0.165*
Mining -0.177* -0.203* 0.026
Utilities 0.277 0.046 0.232
Construction -0.103* -0.042 -0.061**
Wholesale	and	Retail	Trade -0.163* -0.104* -0.059
Transport 0.117 0.000 0.117
Finance	 -0.134** -0.077 -0.058
CSPS -0.040 -0.098* 0.058
Private	Households -0.506* -0.410* -0.096
Experience 0.015* 0.006 0.009
Experience	squared 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log	of	hours	worked	per	month -0.102** 0.036 -0.137*
Private	Sector	BC	Member -0.058 -0.078* 0.020
Public	Sector	BC	Member -0.045 -0.095* 0.050
Union -0.247* -0.112* -0.135*
Emp_lambda 0.188 -0.030 0.218**
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Constant 1.494 0.496* 0.998*
No	of	Observations 14746 14746 14746
High	Quantile	Pseudo	R2 0.402 0.402 0.4122
Low	Quantile	Pseudo	R2 0.238 0.4122 0.238
Source:	 LFS	2005(2)	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Notes: * Significant at the one percent level
 ** Significant at the five percent level
 Other and unspecified categories were omitted from the table
